We now lay out our theory in three steps. First, we clarify how it is logically possible for an individual to regard someone as authen- tic even though the person is known to be insincere—that is, to tell falsehoods deliber- ately. This appears inconsistent with the defi- nition of authenticity whereby “someone (or something) is authentic to the extent that s/he (it) is what s/he (its producer) claims (it) to be” (see Hahl, Zuckerman, and Kim 2017).7 This problem is resolved, however, when the type of lie is such that the speaker flagrantly violates the norm of upholding the difference between truth and falsehood (Frankfurt 2005). This takes us to the second step, which involves resolving the question of how it is logically possible to regard someone as authentic even though they continually vio- late publicly-held norms. This is more easily resolved, because past research demonstrates that public compliance with norms often masks the suppression of widespread private dissent (e.g., Centola, Willer, and Macy 2005; Kuran 1995; Prentice and Miller 1993; Wedeen 1999). This gap between public com- pliance and private dissent creates an opening for a demagogue to claim she is conveying a deeper truth and is the authentic champion of those whose voices have been muzzled by the established leadership. Finally, our theory addresses the social and political conditions under which the lying demagogue’s claim will have persuasive power. We argue that the authentic appeal of the lying demagogue is rooted in the conditions identified by Lipset (1959, 1960) as responsible for a “crisis of legitimacy” with respect to a particular con- stituency. Under such conditions, the lying demagogue will seem more authentic in her claims to be champion of this constituency if she is willing to burn her bridge to accept- ability in the political establishment.
Two Kinds of Lies
Let us first define a lie as a statement that (1) is couched in the form of an assertion of
objective fact but is in fact false; and (2) is asserted even though the speaker knows it is false. A liar would then be someone who, because he has told lies repeatedly, has acquired a reputation for telling lies. As noted in the introduction, it would seem illogical for anyone to trust a liar to be their agent, and this clearly extends to the case of politicians. To be sure, lying can be unproblematic, and even preferable, when the lie is a “white lie” or a “prosocial lie” (Levine and Schweitzer 2015), whereby the speaker and the listener share an understanding that a larger shared purpose is better served by concealing or distorting the truth. In addition, political leaders may be forgiven if a false justification for a decision can later be explained as having been neces- sary to mobilize support for an action that would have been unpopular if discussed openly at the time (Mearsheimer 2010). But what about when a politician makes state- ments that are known to be false at the time and that do not conceal any problematic truths? In short, such politicians would seem insincere and therefore inauthentic; and this inauthenticity would seem to disqualify them as viable electoral choices.
But let us now make a further conceptual distinction between two ideal-types of lies, one we will call a “special-access lie” and one we will call a “common-knowledge lie.” Figure 1 visually represents this distinction. A special- access lie is a deliberately false statement based on facts about which the speaker is thought to have special access. A good exam- ple of such a lie is Bill Clinton’s notorious false claim that he “did not have sexual rela- tions with that woman” (i.e., Monica Lewin- sky). If the liar is a political candidate, the lie could pertain to her past actions, her relation- ships, or her future commitments. Another good example is George H. W. Bush’s famous false campaign promise, “Read my lips: no new taxes.”8 Generally speaking, when politi- cal candidates are accused of being liars, these are the types of lies they are alleged to have told. And it is often the case that the truth or falsehood is not revealed until after the politi- cal campaign is over. Accordingly, a basic reason why politicians tell such lies is that they are gambling that their falsehood will never be uncovered—perhaps because they will have political influence over those who would uncover the lie (Davis and Ferrantino 1996; McGraw 1998). Such a politician is indirectly reinforcing the norm that speakers should make true statements and avoid false ones; the implicit claim is that the truth is important and her statement is true.
A common-knowledge lie is quite differ- ent. This is a false assertion about facts to which the speaker has no special access. Donald Trump told many special-access lies during the U.S. presidential campaign and afterward (e.g., his claim that he had never done business with “the Russians”), but his lies are distinctive for including so many common-knowledge lies. For instance, Trump often pointed to information that was suppos- edly in the public domain to support his claims, even if it was easily demonstrable that such supporting evidence did not exist (e.g., his claim that his election victory was “the biggest electoral college win since Ronald Reagan,” or his claims regarding the size of the crowd at his inauguration). As such, the ideal-typical case of this type of lie is one in which the speaker not only knows the state- ment is false, but she knows her listeners also know that she knows the statement is false; it is thus common knowledge that the statement is false. Accordingly, the findings presented in the Appendix indicate that the vast major- ity of Trump supporters did not think his claim that the Chinese invented the concept of climate change was true.
The distinction between special-access and common-knowledge lies is an analytic one; many lies (e.g., Hillary Clinton’s lie that “I never sent nor received any email that was marked classified”) may fall somewhere between the polar cases. But the distinction is useful because it clarifies what is at stake. In particular, whereas the speaker of a special- access lie is implicitly upholding the norm of truth-telling, the common-knowledge liar is implicitly attacking this norm. Following Frankfurt (2005), such a liar is a type of “bullshit artist”: he is publicly challenging truth as a prescriptive norm. Indeed, although it may be possible to signal that one is engaged in bullshit artistry even while telling a special- access lie (perhaps the manner by which the lieistoldconveysalackofseriousnessabout the truth-telling norm), the challenge is much clearer when it is common knowledge that the statement is false. Insofar as a speaker seems capable of distinguishing between truth and falsehood and yet utters a statement everyone knows is false, the speaker is flouting the norm of truth-telling and inviting his listeners to endorse such violations. Indeed, listeners are complicit in the norm violation as long as they do not challenge him—and especially if they applaud him.
Demagoguery as Speaking Truth about Power
Our question has now been reduced to a more manageable one: How can someone who claims to promote the popular will be seen as authentic even though he breaks publicly- held norms, including those pertaining to distinguishing known truths from known falsehoods? This question is more manage- able because past research indicates that pub- lic compliance with prescriptive norms often masks significant dissent (e.g., Kuran 1995; Prentice and Miller 1993; Wedeen 1999). A minority—or even a majority under some conditions (Centola et al. 2005)—may pri- vately disagree with publicly-endorsed norms, but a group’s established leadership (however formal or informal) tends to determine group membership, at least in part, based on compli- ance with such norms. Accordingly, individu- als who seek social acceptance generally have an incentive to hide their deviance through public compliance and even to enforce a norm they do not privately endorse (Willer, Kuwabara, and Macy 2009; cf. Kim and Zuckerman Sivan 2017). Moreover, a com- mon and powerful way to signal commitment to a group—and its leadership’s legitimacy— is by publicly complying even though it is known that one does not privately endorse the norm (Kim 2017).
This gap between publicly-endorsed norms and private beliefs is the basis for our defini- tion of demagoguery (see, e.g., Gustainis 1990; Mercieca 2015)—that is, an appeal to counter-normative beliefs (generally dis- cussed as “prejudices”) that are otherwise suppressed. The demagogue distinguishes himself in his willingness to bear the social consequences of publicly saying that the emperor is naked. He may not claim to speak “truth to power,” but he claims to speak a larger truth about power—that social control (e.g., “political correctness” as described in Swaim [2016]) is suppressing significant pri- vate dissent.
Put differently, voters have two ways to determine a candidate’s authenticity. One approach is to determine authenticity on the basis of the candidate’s sincerity or prosocial- ity: inauthentic candidates are those who tell lies or who violate publicly-endorsed norms. A second approach for determining authentic- ity is based on the implicit claim of the lying demagogue—that is, publicly-endorsed norms are imposed rather than freely chosen. The lying demagogue thus claims to be an authen- tic champion of those who are subject to social control by the established political lead- ership. Such a claim gains credence to the extent that two conditions hold: (1) there are in fact gaps between publicly-endorsed norms and privately-held beliefs, thus indicating that true opinions are being suppressed; and (2) the politician is willing to sacrifice his acceptance by the establishment. Viewed this way, each method of determining authenticity is consist- ent with previous work that shows audiences tend to attribute authenticity to a person who is publicly willing to “assume responsibility for his or her actions, and makes explicit values- based choices concerning those actions and appearances rather than accepting pre- programmed or socially imposed values and actions” (Carroll and Wheaton 2009:261).9 Yet the actions of each type of authentic actor are clearly in opposition to each other, with respect to upholding establishment norms. In fact, by the “authentic champion” logic, the more dramatic the departure from the norms the establishment uses to determine accepta- bility, the more credible are the lying dema- gogue’s claims to represent those who see such norms as instruments of social control.
Crises of Legitimacy Pave the Demagogue’s Way
If there are two alternative ways to interpret the same facts and conclude that a political candidate is authentic—one based on sincerity/ prosociality and one based on authentic cham- pionhood—this raises the question of which will be chosen. The literature on motivated reasoning (Kunda 1990) suggests this will depend on two factors: whether a voter’s inter- est is better served by one interpretation or the other; and whether that interpretation plausibly fits the available evidence. More specifically, as relates to the question at hand, we argue that these factors will vary with (1) the social cat- egory with which a voter identifies; and (2) whether the political system may be perceived as suffering from a “crisis of legitimacy” (Lipset 1959, 1960; for a review, see Mast 2017) with respect to that social category.
Lipset’s (1960:78) delineation of two char- acteristic types of legitimacy crisis is helpful for fleshing out the logic and providing two different contexts in which to develop and test our theory. What we will call a representation crisis occurs when “[not] all the major groups in society . . . have access to the political sys- tem.” And what we will call a power-devalu- ation crisis occurs when “the status of major conservative institutions is threatened during [a] period of structural change.”
A representation crisis is straightforward in that it is the basis for classic populist appeals (for a review, see Bonikowski and Gidron 2016b). It occurs when established political leaders claim to govern on behalf of all citizens but in fact are believed to pursue their own interests or that of an incumbent social category—that is, a group that has enjoyed more rights or resources in the past. It is understandable why members of other social categories would feel aggrieved under those conditions, especially if established political leaders claim that the government serves all members of society. In short, the government seems illegitimate because it promotes democratic norms that it does not in fact uphold. Figure 2 depicts this type of crisis of legitimacy. Judis (2016:72) charac- terizes this as a “dyadic” socio-political dynamic because two actors are involved: a group who are outsiders, in that they do not feel they are being served by the political establishment (but who may regard them- selves as the “silent majority”), and an incumbent group that controls the establish- ment. Two examples from U.S. history of populist movements that claimed a represen- tation crisis are (Louisiana politician) Huey Long’s “share our wealth” challenge to Franklin D. Roosevelt’s early administration, and the populist movement’s campaign for “free silver” in the last decade of the nine- teenth century (Judis 2016).
It is clear why a representation crisis breeds conditions where the lying demagogue might seem like an authentic champion. By implicitly arguing that publicly-endorsed norms belie significant private dissent, the demagogue is signaling to his constituency that he can serve as an effective voice.10 Moreover, the greater his willingness to antag- onize the establishment by making himself persona non grata, the more credible is his claim to be his constituency’s leader. His fla- grant violation of norms (including that of truth-telling; see Judis 2016:72–73) makes him odious to the establishment, someone from whom they must distance themselves lest they be tainted by scandal (Adut 2008). But this very need by the establishment to distance itself from the lying demagogue lends credibility to his claim to be an authentic championforthosewhofeeldisenfranchised by that establishment. By contrast, someone who does not flagrantly violate publicly- endorsed norms should not provoke the same negative reaction from the establishment and thus seems less obviously committed to chal- lenging it.
The logic of power-devaluation crises ena- bles lying demagoguery in the same basic manner as representation crises, but a distinct socio-political dynamic is at work. In Judis’s (2016) analysis, and as depicted in Figure 3, these crises involve three groups: (1) a politi- cal establishment; (2) an incumbent group who sees itself as the “real people” (Müller 2016) but has been losing power; and (3) a group of erstwhile outsiders who are rising and whom the incumbent group views as being unfairly favored by the establishment.
Research on this type of crisis began in the mid-1950s with Hofstadter’s (1955) and Lipset’s (1959) analyses of “status politics.” This idea was developed further by Gusfield (1986) in his analysis of the temperance movement. This literature focused on politi- cal movements that were driven by a sense of injustice but were often focused on symbolic issues rather than material ones (e.g., the legality of alcohol use) and emerged from a middle-class constituency (Ranulf 1964). The common denominator was a sense that the erstwhile higher-status category was losing status relative to groups that had formerly been even lower status. More recently, McVeigh’s (1999, 2009) analysis of the Ku Klux Klan in the 1920s and the Tea Party after 2008 suggests that such conservative movements are driven by a mix of status, economic, and political changes that sow fear of power-devaluation among those who pre- viously felt they were part of the establish- ment. This sentiment is due not simply to the fact that their social category is falling in power, but that upstart social categories, in such groups’ views, are being unjustly favored by the establishment. For example, the Ku Klux Klan of the 1920s alleged that the gov- ernment was beholden to corporate interests that were imposing unfair competition on them by inviting masses of unskilled immigrants (McVeigh 2009), and many of Donald Trump’s supporters saw the Federal govern- ment as illegitimate because it helped non- whites and immigrants “jump the queue” through affirmative action programs (Hochs- child 2016; see also Gest 2016; Williams 2017; Wood 2017).
Such a power-devaluation crisis thus cre- ates conditions under which a traditionalist or right-wing lying demagogue should have authentic appeal. The logic is the same as in a representation crisis, but now the demagogue is challenging new norms rather than existing ones, and he is arguing that the establishment is illegitimate because it has betrayed the val- ues and interests of an incumbent group that had previously held sway for appropriate reasons. Again, the demagogue will seem more of an authentic champion insofar as her norm-breaking induces the (new) establish- ment to denigrate her, thus making her seem more committed to the aggrieved constitu- ency than is a candidate who does not fla- grantly break (the new) norms.
The upshot is that under either type of crisis of legitimacy, what might seem from the out- side to be an irrational assessment, whereby one attributes authenticity to a liar and public- mindedness to a norm-breaker, is in fact a rea- sonable consequence of socio-political position and motivated reasoning. We argue that when voters identify with an “aggrieved” social cat- egory—that is, one whose members see them- selves as unfairly treated by the political establishment, they will be more motivated to view demagogic falsehoods from a candidate claiming to serve them as gestures of symbolic protest against the dominant group. When this happens, such voters will view the candidate making these statements as more authentic than would people in other social categories.
The most general statement of our argu- ment may be summarized as follows:
Proposition: Voters who identify with social category X will attribute greater authentic- ity to a lying demagogue (relative to a can- didate who is not a lying demagogue) who represents X insofar as members of X feel aggrieved due to at least one type of legiti- macy crisis:
Representation crisis: X is an outsider social category and its members perceive the political establishment as serving incumbents at the expense of the public welfare.
Power-devaluation crisis: X is an incum- bent social category and its members perceive the political establishment as unfairly favoring an outsider category Y.
Fra: The Authentic Appeal of the Lying Demagogue: Proclaiming the Deeper Truth about Political Illegitimacy.
Oliver Hahl ,a Minjae Kim,b and Ezra W. Zuckerman Sivanb
Tillegg:
American Sociological Review 2018, Vol. 83(1) 1–33