Politikk, religion og samfunn Kina, en trussel?

[Mar-a-Lago Club]

"One thing that stayed with me was their response when I asked about their plans for the future. Nearly all happily declared an intent to go to college and major in physics, chemistry, or engineering."

Sosialantropologi med spesiale innen hierarkiske relasjoner mellom studenter som "tar" kunsthistorie er ikke tingen i Kina.

 

[tjua]

En kusine av meg var på BI utveksling på et universitet i Shanghai eller Singapore tidlig 2000 tallet. Doble mastere var normen og jobbytte skjedde ofte på gata med sign on fee

En dansk forretningsforbindelse hadde vært fabrikksjef i Kina og forklarte veksten av roboter (og påfølgende KI) med at nyttårsfeiringen var deres største risiko. Man visste aldri hvem som kom tilbake på jobb etter nyttår.
Roboter (og KI) setter selvfølgelig større krav til utdanning, både for de som utvikler disse, de som opererer og de som driftet og vedlikeholder.

med målsettingen om verdensherredømme er det jobb nok for alle i de genrene

 

[Tweedjakke]

China Against China

Xi Jinping confronts the downsides of success.

www.foreignaffairs.com

Dagens giveaway frå Foreign Affairs. Grei gjennomgang av dei sentraliserande grepa Xi har gjort, og kvifor. Det interessante er kanskje samanlikninga med USA på slutten:

The Trump administration, similar to Xi, argues that executive power has become too diffuse and has undertaken aggressive efforts to centralize and personalize executive authority in the president. The increasingly unchecked and unbalanced executive power in the United States resembles that of other troubled and polarized republics led by populists that ruled Latin America for much of the twentieth century. But whereas Trump’s project deviates from how the U.S. system is designed to function, Xi’s power consolidation is consistent with the CCP’s operational DNA, which tends to empower rather than constrain the top leader. The result is that Trump is generating policy volatility and political turmoil that undermines U.S. capacity, whereas Xi’s centralization has buttressed Chinese resilience.

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has badly mishandled just about every national crisis it has faced. Each of these has diminished public confidence in the United States, both at home and abroad. In response to the 9/11 attacks, the United States launched, on false pretenses, a destructive and costly war in Iraq that sapped the country of the appetite or ability to deal with more formidable future challengers such as China. In its response to the 2008 financial crisis, Washington rescued the financial sector but not its victims, worsening inequality and generating public disillusionment. And in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic, despite having some of the most esteemed public health institutions in the world, the U.S. government bungled its response, further feeding suspicion and undermining public trust.

And whereas U.S. thinkers such as Hal Brands have argued in their analyses of China that a power that has peaked is likely to lash out in violent ways, Chinese observers independently conclude that it is Washington that is anxious about preserving its position—and is increasingly willing to employ any means necessary to sustain its preeminence.

Indeed, a growing number of officials in Washington employ Cold War–style rhetoric when discussing China yet demonstrate little appetite to take on the difficult and expensive tasks, such as refurbishing the defense industrial base and shoring up key supply chains, that would help the United States outcompete China. If this dynamic continues, the United States will be left pursuing what might be called a “Reverse Roosevelt” strategy: speaking loudly about American power while wielding an ever-smaller stick. While Xi has been disciplined and methodical in his efforts to bolster China’s strategic position, the United States has been distracted and incoherent. Misreading Xi Jinping is, ultimately, part of the failure to address the problems facing the United States itself.

 

[tjua]

China Against China

Xi Jinping confronts the downsides of success.

www.foreignaffairs.com

Dagens giveaway frå Foreign Affairs. Grei gjennomgang av dei sentraliserande grepa Xi har gjort, og kvifor. Det interessante er kanskje samanlikninga med USA på slutten:

Sånn enkel forklaring kan vel være østens mystikk vs vestens 4 års sykler på ledelse av landet
For andre er det langsiktighet som gjelder; om det ikke skjer i min tid så kanskje i neste..