Hvem er disse settlerne som volder så store problemer:
http://www.fmep.org/analysis/analysis/israeli-settler-groups-in-the-west-bank
Israeli Settler Groups in the West Bank
filed under: Israeli Policy, Settlements
Adam Baron | August 28, 2008
(Adam Baron, an undergraduate at Williams College who is spending the current quarter at American University, Cairo, served as an intern at the Foundation for Middle East peace during the summer of 2008)
Israeli settlers in the West Bank represent different religious and other communities in Israel. Settlers motives for living in the West Bank vary. Out of the 119 Israeli settlements in the West Bank, 8 are Ultra-Orthodox (sometimes known as Haredi). 46 are Religious Zionist, 45 are secular and 20 have a mixed religious and secular population.[1]
Religious Zionists
Reasons for Settling in the West Bank
Religious Zionists have been at the forefront of the settlement movement. Associated with the Gush Emunim settler movement and the National Religious Party, Religious Zionists see their presence in the West Bank as fulfilling a biblical mandate and hastening the coming of the Messiah.[2] They see themselves as performing the central role in repopulating the Land of Israel, where Jewish kingdoms existed in ancient times, and as the vanguard of a theocratic Jewish state.[3] Many Religious Zionist settlements, for example Kiryat Arba in Hebron, were founded around biblical sites, giving residents a sense of connection with their biblical roots.[4]
Quality of life factors such as better, cheaper housing, more amenities and a pleasant rural environment in the stunning hill scenery of the West Bank, while secondary to religious goals, also motivate Religious Zionist settlers to live in the West Bank. The rural, inexpensive paradise depicted in settlement websites and other promotional materials contrasts starkly with the congested urban environment and astronomical housing prices of much of Israel proper; the website of the Einav settlement, for example, beckons potential olim with a warm, caring home with the large, grassy lawn your kidsll [sic] love, still within commuting distance of Jerusalem and Tel Aviv.[5] A resident of the Tkoa settlement describes satisfaction that in the West Bank, Israelis find a home where they can fulfill ideological aspirations, enjoy quality of life, and savor the beauty of Eretz Yisrael.[6]
Reactions to the Possibility of Disengagement
Religious Zionist settlers feel a general apprehension about the Israeli governments intentions, especially after Israels evacuation of settlements in Gaza in the 2005 disengagement, which provoked deep anger in that community.[7] In some Religious Zionist settlements, some extremist rabbis and other radicals have begun to openly support disobedience by settlers and others serving in the IDF.[8] In addition there has been increased violence against Palestinians near these settlements. Most Religious Zionist settlers see the Israeli state as a tool for securing their primary concern of reclaiming the entire ancient Jewish homeland.[9] There is a tremendous mythological attachment to the land; the dominant Religious Zionist narrative has become sacrifice in defense of the sacred land, of Eretz Israel, above all else.[10]
Politics
Because of the association between the settler group Gush Emunim and the National Religious Party, Religious Zionist settlers have traditionally voted heavily for the NRP and, since its formation in 1999, the extreme right-wing National Union.[11] In the 2006 Knesset elections, the NRP and National Union ran as a joint ticket, gaining a majority of the vote in all but two of the Religious Zionist Settlements. Other far right-wing parties also have gained significant portions of the Religious Settler vote: in the 2006 election the National Jewish Front, a new radical right wing party, won more than 10% of the vote in 13 Religious Zionist settlements located east of the separation barrier, mainly those that were associated with the banned ultra-right wing, racist Kach party of the late Meir Kahane.[12]
Ultra-Orthodox Settlers
Reasons for Settling in the West Bank
While the ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) settlers are deeply religious, in contrast to the Religious Zionists they are non-Zionist and do not share the concept of a temporal Jewish state. They are not settlement activists, and are not in the forefront of the settler movement.[13]
The first ultra-Orthodox settlements were built in the early 1980s by Likud governments as a strategy to increase the settler population in the West Bank in order to strengthen Israeli hegemony there. The ultra-Orthodox prefer to live apart from other Israelis and were dealing with severe overcrowding in their communities inside the Green Line due to their higher than average birth rate. They therefore have found life in the West Bank attractive.[14] Due to a combination of emigration and high birthrates, they currently comprise 25% of the total settler population. Today, more than half of new settlement construction in the West Bank is in the ultra-Orthodox settlements of Beitar Illit and Modiin Illit, both of which are located west of the settlement barrier.[15]
Reactions to the Possibility of Disengagement
Unlike Religious Zionist settlers, ultra-Orthodox Israelis who settle in the West Bank are there because of cheap, subsidized housing rather than devotion to the idea of Eretz Israel. Many ultra-Orthodox settlers are quite apprehensive about living close to Palestinians in the occupied territories. In any case, the ultra-Orthodox leadership has not taken a clear political stance on the settlement issue.[16]
Nevertheless, Religious Zionist leaders have begun to see the ultra-Orthodox settlers as potential allies, recognizing that the growing ultra-Orthodox demographic presence intersects with their interest in Jewish control and domination of the West Bank.[17] Settler leaders have stated that they believe ultra-Orthodox are not likely to leave the West Bank quietly. Indeed, many, though by no means most, ultra-Orthodox settlers participated in vocal, and occasionally violent, protests of the 2005 disengagement.[18] However, as an academic who has studied the settlements wryly noted, ultra-Orthodox settlers would likely be appeased if offered apartments in Jerusalem as compensation.[19] In any case, many Israelis believe that if there is a two-state peace agreement, the ultimate border will be drawn to protect the large ultra-orthodox settlements of Modiin and Betar Illit, and that these will be merged into Israel.
Politics
Most ultra-Orthodox settlers vote for ultra-Orthodox parties Shas and United Torah Judaism. In the 2006 Knesset elections, these parties won 10% and 12.6% of the settler vote, respectively, mostly from ultra-Orthodox communities. The ultra-Orthodox party vote was lower in ultra-Orthodox communities east of the separation wall, with far-right parties like the traditionally Religious Zionist NRP and the Kach-legacy Jewish National Front garnering larger percentages of the vote, suggesting increasing political ties between the ultra-Orthodox and the Religious Zionists.[20]
Secular Settlers
Reasons for Settling in the West Bank
Secular settlers, who represent about 35% of all settlers in the West Bank, like the Ultra-Orthodox, have been motivated to settle in the West Bank for mainly quality of life reasons.[21] A dominant majority of secular Israelis do not share the Religious Zionist drive to fill the West Bank with Jews. In the past, Labor and Likud governments built settlements in what they regarded as strategically important areas of the West bank for security reasons and because they shared the partriotic Zionist ethos of settlement without regarding it as a religious duty.. Governments of both parties offered a wide array of housing, education and tax subsidies in order to encourage Israelis who lacked the religious motivation of Religious Zionists to settle in the West Bank.[22] In contrast to the Religious Zionists, who often settled in areas with religious or historical significance, secular settlers have tended to settle in areas within an easy commute to cities in Israel.[23] Likud administrations that pushed for these settlements believed that by encouraging non-ideological Israelis to settle in the West Bank, they would ultimately adopt more hawkish political views.[24] This has generally proven true, as secular settlers increasingly vote for rightist parties. Before the 2006 elections, the secular Israeli settlements were seen as Likud strongholds.
Subgroup: Russian Settlers
Immigrants to Israel from the former Soviet Union, an estimated 10% of the population of the West Bank, are overwhelmingly secular, a legacy of Soviet rule.[25] Reflecting their secular nature, most immigrants from the former Soviet Union have not settled in the West Bank.[26] They are mainly attracted to the West Bank for economic reasons, settling in large, stable settlements; indeed, many Russian immigrants who settle in the West Bank do so without knowledge of the regions contentious political situation.[27] Despite that, for the most part, Russian immigrants have taken a hard-line, nationalistic approach to negotiations with the Palestinians, traditionally supporting secular right-wing parties.[28]
Subgroup: The Jordan Valley Settlers
Another, separate, group of secular Israeli settlers are in the Eastern region of the West Bank near the border of Jordan. The Labor Party established these secular Jordan Valley settlements help Israels defenses along the Jordanian border. In the early 1980s Likud gained a foothold in the valley, which it maintained until the 2006 elections.[29] In general, Jordan Valley settlements are not growing; with a few exceptions, secular Jordan Valley settlements experienced negative or stagnant growth from 1999 to 2006, due to a combination of an agricultural crisis and the remoteness of the settlements.[30] However, the Israeli Ministry of Agriculture still maintains a goal of doubling the population of the Jordan Valley settlements.[31]
Reactions to the Possibility of Disengagement
In contrast to the Religious Zionist settlers, secular settlers in the West Bank do not feel an unyielding loyalty to the land. Some continue to view settlements as a security asset, but there is growing opinion to the contrary. Today, even very right wing, hawkish figures in the secular settler camp see no intrinsic problem with some degree of withdrawal. For example, Avigdor Liebermans controversial Lieberman Plan proposed giving up areas of the state of Israel proper adjacent to the West Bank where Arab-Israelis are the dominant populace, in return for annexation of West Bank settlements.[32] However, it is clear that while secular settlers may not be opposed to the idea of withdrawal on principle, they are generally unsympathetic to the Palestinians and many are not eager to relocate.[33] However, polls show that many secular settlers in the more remote settlements east of the separation barrier, particularly those in the Jordan Valley, admit a high readiness to leave in exchange for compensation.[34]
Politics
Politically, secular settlements in the West Bank have long been considered Likud strongholds. While Likud was still the best performing secular party in the West Bank in the 2006 Knesset elections, there were considerable cracks in its hegemony as Kadima and Yisrael Beitenu took votes from both its left and right.[35] The ruling and more centrist Kadima party won 10.4% of the West Bank settler vote to Likuds 11%. Further, Yisrael Beitenu, headed by Avigdor Lieberman, a hardline Russian immigrant and West Bank settler, won significant percentages of the vote in traditional Likud strongholds, Ariel, for example, with high Russian populations.[36] Labor won less than five percent of the total West Bank vote, winning all of its majority or pluralities in Jordan Valley settlements.
